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Abstract—Future robots should follow human social norms in
order to be useful and accepted in human society. In this paper,
we leverage already existing social knowledge in human societies
by capturing it in our framework through the notion of social
norms. We show how norms can be used to guide a reinforcement
learning agent towards achieving normative behavior and apply
the same set of norms over different domains. Thus, we are
able to: (1) provide a way to intuitively encode social knowledge
(through norms); (2) guide learning towards normative behaviors
(through an automatic norm reward system); and (3) achieve
a transfer of learning by abstracting policies; Finally, (4) the
method is not dependent on a particular RL algorithm. We show
how our approach can be seen as a means to achieve abstract
representation and learn procedural knowledge based on the
declarative semantics of norms and discuss possible implications
of this in some areas of cognitive science.
Index Terms—Norms, Institutions, Automatic Reward Shap-
ing, Transfer of Learning, Abstract Policies, Abstraction, State-
Space Selection, Schema
I. INTRODUCTION
In order to be accepted in human society, robots need
to comply with human social norms. The main goal of our
research is to make robots capable of behaving in a socially-
acceptable way, i.e., to adhere to social norms. In this paper,
we do this by applying social norms in reinforcement learning
(RL) settings.
In recent years, reinforcement learning has achieved notable
successes in simulated environments like classical Atari [1]
or board games e.g., go [2], chess [3] and other computer
games [4], [5]. Additionally, significant successes have been
achieved in real physical robotic control, after first learning
policies in a simulated environment [6]. Despite such impres-
sive developments, RL is still mainly relegated to relatively
tightly controlled settings. Using RL in real-world settings
poses significant challenges, most notably, the credit assign-
ment problem, which concerns how an action taken earlier
influences the final reward, the size of state space, and the
amount of training data. Also, the transfer of learned policies,
to novel domains is not trivial to achieve. Challenges are com-
plicated by the fact that robots have to act in the social space
shared with humans. For example, in a learning process driven
by exploration, an agent is not necessarily acting towards the
achievement of a goal, which may result in possibly dangerous
unexpected behaviors. Furthermore, learned behaviors and
interaction with other agents or objects, may not be easily
understandable or may seem odd to humans, thus making
it difficult to realize human-level social interactions. Policies
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obtained via RL lead an agent to act in a way that maximizes
the reward function, meaning that an agent may learn to
achieve its goal in a way which is not socially acceptable. This
somewhat Machiavellistic characteristic of RL agents indicates
that policies that are to be used in social environments should
be subject to, or at least biased by, social norms.
To make robotic RL agents behave socially, we aim to
create policies that produce normative behavior depending
on the social situation. In doing so, we also wish to avoid
hand-crafting policies (or the decision-theoretic planning [7]
models), that is, provide agents with principles that can be
applied across domains and boundary conditions. We combine
specification and learning of social norms, so that these social
norms can be applied in a general and reusable way to agents
that learn, resulting in learned policies that generate normative
behaviors. Towards this end, we propose the use of institutions
(e.g. [8], [9], [10]). Institutions give a social dimension to the
actions of agents and provide regulative mechanisms to guide
agents in their interactions towards normative behaviors. The
advantage of using institutions is twofold: (A) They provide
social knowledge by capturing the set of norms that should
be followed given the current situation; (B) Norms in the
institution are usually abstracted from the domain in which
they can be applied, thus the same set of norms can be applied
in different domains.
In this paper, we leverage the fact that our institutional
model can distinguish between socially acceptable and not
acceptable behaviors by formally verifying them against norm
semantics and by exploiting the facts (A) and (B). As we will
see, (A) can be used to automatically create a reward system
that can guide RL towards policies that adhere to norms, ad-
dressing the well-known credit assignment problem, while (B)
will allow us to create abstracted normative policies, address-
ing state-space reduction with automatic state-space/feature
selection, which can be applied in different domains without
re-learning. Finally, the framework is agnostic to the particular
learning / RL approach.
We start with a brief look at the related work, followed by a
description of the basics of our institutional framework. Then
we cover the background of RL approaches and describe how
we used our framework in RL settings. A set of experiments
are then presented as proofs of concept that: (1) normative
policies can indeed be learned; (2) an automatic reward system
based on norms can be created that helps robotic agents learn
in the right direction; (3) policies can be abstracted and applied
to different domains; and (4) our approach can be used in
multi-agent settings. Finally, we discuss our achievements with
the focus on abstract knowledge representation and its possible
further implications.
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2II. RELATED WORK
Classical Problems in RL. One of the well-known problems
in RL, the the credit assignment problem [11], decreases learn-
ing ability for long temporal horizons with sparse rewards.
The curse of dimensionality [12] is another problem where
the exploration of states has to increase exponentially with
the increase of state space. Social robots face these problems
since they should act in a physical world with a complex
state-space and long temporal horizons. Finally, the transfer
of learning – how learned knowledge can be reused for novel
domains – is notoriously difficult. Several ways to address
these problems have been reported in the literature. RL agents
can receive intermediate rewards which serve as ‘progress
estimators’ (indicators), which reduces exploration and directs
an agent’s behavior towards the goal. Mataric´ [13] shows how
this can significantly reduce learning time. Ng et al. [14] ana-
lyzed ‘reward shaping’ mechanisms and a potential-shaping
function that can speed up convergence without changing
the previous optimal policy. The major shortcoming of this
approach is that such intermediate feedback signals require
significant engineering effort. Hierarchical RL (HRL) provides
a different approach to address long temporal horizons. In such
methods, the domain (or temporal aspect of it) are represented
at another level of abstraction [15]. HRL methods mitigate
the temporal assignment problem: by shortening the temporal
horizon, better (structural) exploration is achieved, while sub-
policies enable transfer learning. A popular way to address
the ‘curse of dimensionality’ problem, especially in robotics,
is to reduce a state space to a smaller one. Behavior-based
systems (BBS) Mataric´ [16] encapsulate behaviors as higher-
level structures combining sensing and action, which helps in
reducing the underlying state-space. Robots are then trained
over such higher-level state space. The state-space can be
reduced, for example, by defining the measure of importance
of a sensor [17] or by learning connections between large
perceptual states spaces and hidden states [18]. Similarly, the
number of agent actions can also be reduced, where the most
popular approach is to do that with the ‘option’ framework
of Sutton et al. [15]. Options can be understood as ‘closed-
loop’ sub-policies with certain duration depending on the
terminating conditions and can combine more primitive agent
actions. In general, state-abstraction and action abstraction are
usually studied separately.
Both reward shaping and state-space/action reduction are
crucial ideas that are utilized in our work. The way we define
the semantics of norms and the way they are associated with
social structures, allows us to naturally abstract both the state-
space and the action space of learning agents. Such abstraction
reduces the dimensionality problem while at the same time
addresses the transfer learning problem so that we can apply
the same norms over novel domains. Furthermore, by utilizing
the process of formal verification, we can assign normative
states to agent behaviors such as fulfillment or violation.
Consequently, behavior can then be evaluated during execution
to define a normative shaping function and to mitigate the
credit assignment problem.
Norms. In the context of RL, learning human normative
behavior is usually achieved through inverse reinforcement
learning (IRL) algirithms [19]. The motivation behind this
area of research is to learn (infer) a reward distribution
from the exemplary behavior of expert humans. The obtained
reward distribution is used in ordinary RL settings to train
artificial agents, where the resulting policies lead to the desired
behavior. While this approach does not learn norms directly,
an additional proposal explicitly represents norms which are
then used to infer them from demonstrated behaviors [20].
Additionally, agents can also be trained to learn behavior based
on human feedback [21].
In our approach, we leverage given social knowledge cap-
tured in the form of social institutions. Our framework enables
us to formally represent this knowledge and use it for learning
normative behavior in RL settings, addressing some of the
classical RL problems described above.
Institutions. The concept of institution stems from economic
and social sciences [8]. The concept is loosely defined across
different fields. According to North [9] institutions are, simply
defined as “the rules of the game in a society”, while Ostrom
[10] defines them as: “the prescriptions that humans use to
organize all forms of repetitive and structured interaction...”.
In multi-agent systems (MAS) institutions are usually seen
as a set of norms. The institution and its norms are used to
coordinate organizations of agents, thus they are sometimes
called “coordination artifacts” [22]. One of the advantages of
using institutions to organize agents is that they are typically
abstracted from the particular agent domain. Thus, ideally,
the same institution should be able to organize different
heterogeneous agents in various environments.
In our work, we use the concept of institution to formal-
ize the normative aspects of a social situation (context) by
encapsulating a set of abstract norms. The core of learning
normative behaviors is concerned with the particular relations
of state values in an agent’s execution trace (norms semantic
functions), which ‘count as’ [8] institutional norms. The
count-as principle is explored in MAS [23]. We employ a
mapping between institutional concepts and a domain, called
grounding. This mapping, realizes the count-as concept, lifting
an agent’s “raw” execution traces to their institutional (social)
meaning and binding them to the normative dimension through
obligations, permissions or prohibitions.
III. THE FORMAL MODEL OF INSTITUTION
We start by introducing our formal institution framework.
The framework is presented in full detail in [24], while in this
section we only present the parts of that framework that are
relevant to this paper.
A. Institutions
Institutions encapsulate a collection of norms together with
the roles, actions and artifacts that these norms refer to. For
example, the desired behaviors of agents participating in a
store (marketplace) can be modeled, where its norms include
relations between sellers, customers, goods. A norm in this
institution could state, for instance, that a buyer should pay
3for certain goods to a certain seller. We define the following
sets:
Roles = {role1, role2, . . . , rolem}
Arts = {art1, art2, . . . , arta}
Acts = {act1, act2, . . . , actk}
Examples of Roles are a ‘customer’ in a store or a ‘goal-
keeper’ in a football game. Arts are the artifacts of the
institution, e.g., ‘goods’ or a ‘cash register’. Acts are actions
that can be performed, e.g., ‘exit’ a location or ‘pay’ for
a carton of milk. We define norms to be predications over
statements:
Definition 1. A norm is a statement of the form q(trp∗),
where q is a qualifier and trp is a triple of the form:
trp ∈ Roles× Acts× (Arts ∪ Roles)
Qualifiers can be unary relations like must or must-not, or
n-ary ones like inside or before. For example, must can be
used to represent the obligation ‘A buyer must pay with cash’:
must ((Buyer,Pays,Cash)) .
A qualifier in front of can specify a spatial constraint on the
location of an action, as in ‘Paying should be performed in
front of a cash register’:
in front of ((Buyer,Pays,CashRegister)) .
Binary qualifiers can express relations between statements,
e.g., temporal relations such as before or during, for instance
before ((Buyer,GetGoods,Goods) , (Buyer,Pays,Cash))
indicating that ‘A buyer should get the goods before paying’.
Institutions put all the above elements together:
Definition 2. An institution is a tuple
I = 〈Arts,Roles,Acts,Norms〉.
This definition embodies a pragmatic view of institutions,
which is in accordance to North’s view that institutions
constitute “the human-devised constraints that shape social
interaction” [9].
B. Domains
An institution is an abstraction, which can be instantiated in
concrete systems that are physically different but are described
by the same structure. For instance, the same ‘store’ institution
can be used to describe or regulate behaviors of agents in
different markets, irrespective of these agents being humans,
robots, or a combination of both. We call such a concrete
system a domain.
The domain (D) is characterized by: the set of agents A
that can include humans (e.g., john), robots (e.g., robby), or
both; the collection B of all behaviors that these humans or
robots can perform, like pick or speak; a set O of objects in
the domain, like door, battery. In addition, a domain includes
a set R = {ρ1 . . . , ρn} of state variables. Each state variable
ρi defines a property pertaining to an entity (agent, behavior,
or object) in the domain. For instance, pos(robby) is a state
variable that indicates the position of the agent robby, while
active(pick, robby) indicates the activation of robby’s behav-
ior pick. We denote with vals(ρ) the set of possible values of
state variable ρ, e.g., vals(active(pick, robby)) = {>,⊥}.
Definition 3. The state space of D is S = ∏ρ∈R vals(ρ),
where vals(ρ) are the possible values of state-variable ρ. We
call any element s ∈ S a state. The value of ρ in state s is
denoted ρ(s).
In a dynamic environment, the values of most properties
change over time. In our formalization, we represent time
points by natural numbers in N, and time intervals by pairs
I = [t1, t2] such that t1, t2 ∈ N and t1 ≤ t2. We denote by I
the set of all such time intervals.
Definition 4. A trajectory is a pair (I, τ), where I ∈ I is a
time interval and τ : I → S maps time to states.
In simple words, a trajectory represents how the domain
evolves over a given time interval.
C. Grounding
Definition 5. Given an institution I and a domain D, a
grounding of I into D is a tuple G = 〈GA,GB ,GO〉, where:
• GA ⊆ Roles×A is a role grounding,
• GB ⊆ Acts×B is an action grounding,
• GO ⊆ Arts×O is an artifact grounding.
Grounding plays an important role in our framework, by
establishing the relation between an abstract institution and
a specific domain. Grounding provides the key to reuse the
same abstract institution to describe or regulate different sys-
tems. For example, the ’store’ institution can be grounded in
analogous environments, e.g. different physical marketplaces,
using different G’s. Also, different institutions can be grounded
to the same domain.
Grounding directly depends on object affordances. For
example, if a grounding maps an agent a to a given role,
and this role involves the execution of a certain action, then a
must be able to perform a behavior that grounds that action.
For more details please refer to [24]. In this paper we assume
that all groundings are admissible.
D. Norms Semantics and States
By grounding an institution I into a domain D, we impose
that the norms stated for abstract entities in I must hold for
the corresponding concrete entities in D. But what does “hold”
mean here? To answer this question, we give norms semantics
in terms of executions in a physical domain: intuitively, the
semantics of norm is the set of all trajectories that comply with
the condition that the norm is meant to express. For example,
the semantics of the norm must ((buyer, getGoods, goods))
is given by all trajectories where the behavior b, to which the
action getGoods is grounded, is executed (at least once) by
any agent a, to which the role buyer is grounded.
4Formally, let T be the set of all possible trajectories (I, τ)
over the state variables of domain D. Given a norm q(trp∗),
we define its semantic Jq(trp∗)K in D as:
Jq(trp∗)K ⊆ T
We differentiate between the following type of norm seman-
tics: Fulfillment semantics, Jq(trp∗)KF , that defines the set
of trajectories fulfilling the norm; and violation semantics,Jq(trp∗)KV , expressing the set of trajectories violating the
norm. Naturally a trajectory cannot be an element of both
fulfillment and violation semantics for a given norm, that
is: Jq(trp∗)KF ∩ Jq(trp∗)KV = ∅. Accordingly, we define a
function that indicates the state of a norm given a trajectory
as follows: ns(q(trp∗), (I, τ)) = {f, v, n}, where f stands for
fulfilled, v for violated and n for neutral state, neither fulfilled
nor violated:
ns :=

f, iff (I, τ) ∈ Jq(trp∗)KF
v, iff (I, τ) ∈ Jq(trp∗)KV
n, otherwise
a) Examples of Semantics.: A variety of norm semantics
can be expressed as constraints on trajectories, i.e., as con-
straints on the possible values of state variables over time.
For example, the fulfillment semantics of the must norm can
be expressed by requiring that the state variable active of the
relevant behavior is true at least once. Formally:Jmust ((role, act, art))KF ≡
{(I, τ) | ∀a ∈ Arole.∃(b, t) ∈ Bact × I :
active(b, a)(τ(t)) = >},
where Arole is the set of all agents role is grounded to, and
Bact is the set of all behaviors act is grounded to. Intuitively,
these semantics select all trajectories where any agent taking
role activates at least once a behavior that performs act.
Variants of this semantics are possible, for example, stating
that the behavior should be enacted at all times (not just
once in the trajectory). In more demanding scenarios, a state
variable indicating ’successful execution’ can be used instead
of simpler ’activation’. Notice that art in the norm is ignored,
since it is not of interest for the semantic definition of this
norm. However, it may be relevant in other norms, as in the
following example:Juse ((role, act, art))KF ≡
{(I, τ) | ∀(b, a, t) ∈ Bact ×Arole × I.∃o ∈ Oart :
(active(b, a)(τ(t)) = > =⇒ usedObj(b, a) = o)},
where Oart is the set of all objects. The semantics states that
all agents in the role grounding with behaviors in the action
grounding that are active should use the same object grounded
to artifacts. Sometimes it is useful to join the semantics of the
norm must and the norm use:JmustUse ((role, act, art))KF ≡
{(I, τ) | ∀a ∈ Arole.∃(b, o, t) ∈ Bact ×Oart × I :
active(b, a)(τ(t)) = > ∧ (active(b, a)(τ(t)) = > =⇒
usedObj(b, a)(τ(t)) = o))},
The semantics selects all trajectories in which grounded agents
with corresponding grounded behaviors are executed, and such
execution implies that grounded objects are used. Similarly
spatial and temporal semantics can be defined. The next
example shows obligatory at semantics:JmustAt ((role, act, art))KF ≡
{(I, τ) | ∀a ∈ Arole.∃(b, o, t) ∈ Bact ×Oart × I :
active(b, a)(τ(t)) = > ∧ (active(b, a)(τ(t)) = > =⇒
position(b, a)(τ(t)) = position(o)(τ(t)))},
An example of temporal semantics is the following:
Jbefore ((role1, act1, art1), (role2, act2, art2))KF ≡
{(I, τ) | ∀(a1, a2) ∈ Arole1 ×Arole2 ,
(b1, b2)×Bact1 ×Bact2 ,∀(t1, t2) ∈ I × I,
(active(b1, a1)(τ(t1)) = > ∧ active(b2, a2)(τ(t2)) = >
=⇒ t1 < t2)∧
(∀(a1, a2) ∈ Arole1 ×Arole2 , (b1, b2)×Bact1 ×Bact2 ,
∃(t1, t2) ∈ I × I :
active(b1, a1)(τ(t1)) = > ∧ active(b2, a2)(τ(t2)) = >)}.
Simply said, ‘before’ fulfill semantics declares that all
grounded agents behaviors for all grounded agents, have to
be in a certain order: the first should precede the second, and
both have to be active at a certain time point in a trajectory.
While for spatial semantics the states n and violated v are
practically the same in most cases, for temporal semantics
it is useful to explicitly define violation semantics, since such
norms can often be in n state thus neither violated nor fulfilled.
One simple way to define violation semantics for the before
norm, Jbefore ((· · · ))KV , would be to switch the non-equality
symbol between time points t1 and t2 to t1 ≥ t2, and to ensure
the activation of the ’second’ behavior:
Jbefore ((role1, act1, art1), (role2, act2, art2))KV ≡
{(I, τ) | ∀(a1, a2, b1, b2) ∈ Arole1 ×Arole2 ×Bact1 ×Bact2
∀(t1, t2) ∈ I × I
(active(b1, a1)(τ(t1)) = > ∧ active(b2, a2)(τ(t2)) = >
=⇒ t1 >= t2) ∧ ∃t′2 ∈ I :
active(b2, a2)(τ(t
′
2)) = > ∧ t2 = t′2}
Note that the semantics does not ensure existence of
(active(b2, a2)(τ(t
′
1)), since if b2 is active at t2 but b1 is not
active at any t1 < t2, the norm is already violated. When a
trajectory is neither fulfilled nor violation, the trajectory is in a
neutral state (n). As we will see, this helps us shape the reward
function and provide informative feedback immediately when
the norm state becomes either fulfilled or violated.
Other types of norms and their semantics can be defined
depending on the application. The expressiveness of norms
depends on two factors, namely on the complexity of relations
in norms semantics and on the availability of appropriate state
variables R. It is important to stress that semantics is given
in the terms of execution and is abstracted, since it is defined
through grounding to abstract institutional concepts.
5An important property of our semantics, which is exploited
in this paper, is that semantics is defined over state-space
variables belonging in a sub-sets of equivalence classes in
the state-space. For example, semantics of the norm ‘must’
is defined over elements in the equivalence class of the state
variables indicating activation of an agent’s behavior:
[active] = {active(a, b) ∈ R | a ∈ A, b ∈ B}
Then, a particular state-variable, used in norm semantics, is
decided by grounding.
E. Adherence
We are now in a position to define what it means for
a given physical system to behave in compliance with an
institution. Consider an institution I, and suppose that I has
been grounded on a given domain D through some grounding
G. Further suppose that all the norms in I are given fulfillment
semantics in D through the function J·KF .
The following definition tells us whether or not a specific,
concrete execution in D adheres to the abstract institution I
given the above grounding and semantics.
Definition 6. A trajectory (I, τ) adheres to an institution I,
with admissible grounding G and semantics function J·KF , if
(I, τ) ∈ JnormKF ,∀ norm ∈ Norms.
With the adherence property, we can distinguish between
trajectories (executions) which are normative (socially ac-
ceptable) and others which are not. To do that, we rely on
the formal verification mechanisms described in our previous
work [24]. With verification, we can evaluate a trajectory and
say if it is adherent (to an institution) or not. Moreover, we can
also evaluate the status of each norm separately during agent
execution. Such states are then used to automatically create a
reward function.
F. From Declarative to Procedural Knowledge
The ontology in our framework is represented with several
layers. The institutional layer specifies abstract norms, through
relations between social-level categories (roles, actions, arti-
facts) providing information about ‘what’ ought to be nor-
mative behavior. By associating an institution (abstract layer)
with the domain (concrete) layer, we give social meaning to
agents behaviors and interactions through declarative norm
semantics in terms of execution. This association is realized
with the middle layer with the notion of grounding. It binds
institution-level norms with the concrete domain elements
(agents, behaviors, objects).
The next section considers answering the question ‘how’:
In which way and when exactly should agents act so that
their behavior is socially acceptable in the context of a given
institution and grounding. While in our previous research we
have achieved synthesizing adherent trajectories with model-
based planners [25], [24], [26], in this paper, we focus our
attention on answering this question with reinforcement learn-
ing algorithms.
IV. APPLYING INSTITUTION MODELS TO RL AGENTS
Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) are an example of how
reinforcement learning can be used to direct the actions of
agents. A MDP is defined as a tuple < S,A,P,R, γ >,
where S is the state space, A is the finite set of actions, P
is the model given as transitions probability between states
depending on actions, and R is a set of rewards – a scalar
feedback signal which agents get as they change their states.
γ ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor indicating the importance of
future rewards. The goal of a RL agent (the RL problem) is to
find a mapping between states and actions which maximizes
the amount of reward the agent receives, known as cumulative
reward or return. Such a mapping represents a policy pi(at |
st), which gives the probability of taking action at ∈ A given
the state st ∈ S. In deterministic policies, this probability is
equal to 1. RL algorithms use the notion of value functions: a
value function V pi(s) provides the expected return of rewards
starting from state s acting according to policy pi; and/or a
action-value function (Q-function), Qpi(s, a), which estimates
the value of a state given the action. Knowing the optimal Q
function (Q∗) gives us an optimal policy for an agent for any
state s, that is, argmax
a∈A
Q∗(s, a). RL algorithms update the
value function either from sampled data, if the model P is
not-known (model-free RL), or by leveraging on the provided
model, where it is possible to use, e.g., dynamic programming
(model-based RL). Value updates propagate the truth about the
rewards until they converge to optimal values. For example, a
standard idea in RL to learn Q-values is known as temporal
difference learning:
Q(s, a)← Q(s, a) + α(r + γ max
a′
Q(s′, a′)−Q(s, a)),
where α is a learning rate, and s′ and a′ are the state and action
subsequent to s and a. For a variety of real world problems
the number of states may be too large to be stored (a tabular
representation), and calculating values for each state may not
be feasible. Value function approximation methods addresses
this problem. The idea is to generalize over (semantically)
similar states across a distributed representation of a state-
space with fewer parameters. In such an approach, state-
space variables are represented as a feature vector, where each
feature is a number, describing some property in the state-
space, e.g., the position of an agent along x coordinate, the
activation of an agent’s behavior, etc. The policy (piθ) is a
computable function (like a neural network), that depends on
a set of parameters θ. Converging to the optimal policy is
not guaranteed, however, usually, policies converge to close
to optimal solutions.
A. From Norms to Rewards
The normative semantics in our model is defined using the
notion of (see Definition 4). A trajectory is constructed from
the values in the state space variables which are changing as
the agents interact with the environment. This allows us to use
norm semantics to evaluate the states of the norms by calcu-
lating if they are in fulfilled, neutral, or violated state. This,
in turn, can be used to feedback signals regarding the agents’
adherence to norms. The schematic view of this approach is
6shown in Figure 1. The ‘institutional model’ box takes only
those states of the environment which are used in the norm
semantics and evaluates norm states. Naturally, to calculate
norm states which have a temporal dimension, a history of
states has to be stored. However, state variables are usually
shared between various norm semantics, thus the increase of
the number of norms usually doesn’t mean a proportional
increase in the number of stored states. Additionally, as done
in our previous research [24], instead of storing values of state
variables in each time-step, the contiguous interval for which
state variables have constant values can be stored, which can
significantly speed up evaluation of norm states. This is a
common approach used in temporal reasoning, planning and
scheduling (e.g., [27], [28], [29]). Note that the ‘institutional
model’ is separated from the concrete RL algorithm and is
used only to provide a feedback signal to RL agents. The state
space in the RL agents complies with the Markov property
(agent action selection depends only on the current state and
not on the history of states).
Fig. 1: RL agents receive feedback signals from the institution.
The signals steer agents learning towards normative behavior.
After the states of the norms are evaluated to either fulfilled,
violated or neutral, the norm reward function takes the states
of norms as an input and returns a feedback signal:
Fnorm : (NS ×NS)→ R
There are 9 possible transitions of norm states which can be
used to signal positive or negative feedback, namely: (f, f),
(f, n), (f, v), (n, f), (n, n), (n, v), (v, f), (v, n), (v, v). The
Fnorm function can be realized in different ways and while
its optimal implementation may depend on the underlying RL
algorithm, we explore the following more general ideas:
a) Feedback from Full Adherence: The adherent reward
is the main reward or the final goal for learning normative
behavior. Agents receive this reward only when their trajectory
is adherent to the institution, i.e., to all institutional norms (see
Definition 6). This happens when all transitions are updated
to a fulfilled state (ns′ = f ). Algorithm 1 realizes Fnorm
where the procedure F norms is called at each training step or
predefined intervals. The algorithm retrieves, for each norm,
its latest state with method GetNS. If all norms are in the
fulfilled state, a reward with the value 1 is returned. However,
this means that an agent has to fulfill all the norms before
it receives ’full adherence’ reward and does not provide any
feedback to norms states separately. Thus this reward is sparse
and does not provide helpful intermediate feedback for the
credit assignment problem.
Algorithm 1: Implementation of Fnorm for ’Full Adher-
ence Feedback Reward’ approach.
Input : The current trajectory ([0, stept],τ)); institution I;
grounding G; norm semantics J·K
Output: 1,0
1 Procedure F_norms(([0, stept], τ), Norms,G, J·KF)
2 foreach norm ∈ I.Norms do
3 (ns, ns′)← GetNS ([0, stept],τ), G, JnormK)
4 if (ns′ 6= f) then
5 return 0;
6 return 1
b) Feedback from Norms States: This approach provides
feedback to the agents as they change the states of norms
and this is used as a mechanism for reward shaping which
indicates partial achievement of the final goal. The norm
reward function assigns fixed numerical values to norm state
transitions. For example, transitions from not-fulfilled to a
fulfilled norm state (n, f) may be rewarded while transitions
to violated states (e.g., (n, v)) may be penalized. This is useful
for temporal norms since violations of temporal requirements
can provide an immediate negative signal. However, this may
not be the best approach, since it can lead to local optima,
e.g., if among other norms, two temporal norms are present,
an agent may break one temporal norm but get the reward
from the second one and all other subsequent norms. This is
not particularly helpful for the temporal assignment problem
and agents can get stuck in local optima.
c) Dynamic Feedback: Similarly, as in the previous case,
feedback is returned from norm state transitions. However,
instead of constant values of norm transitions, they are de-
pendent on each other or controlled by an additional (cus-
tomizable) function, e.g., “Stop all future rewards (assign a
value of 0) if a violation has happened”. Here, one doesn’t
want to continue to reward agents trajectories after a violation.
This enables agents to learn only from temporally consistent
(ordered) normative behaviors.
While feedback from norms can be used for reward shaping,
and consequently, speed-up learning, we still cannot apply
the same abstract norms to novel domains with different
agents, behaviors, and objects. For example, let’s say that
n1 is an obligation norm mustUse(Buyer,Get,Goods) and
grounding: Ga = {Buyer, robot1}, Gb = {Get, pick} and
Go = {Goods, battery}. The policy will learn normative
behavior, declared in the semantics of that norm, i.e., that
agent robot1 should execute the particular behavior pick,
and take the particular object battery. The policy learns on
the exact elements represented in the domain state-space.
If we change the grounding (using the same norm), e.g.,
Go = {Goods, box}, the agent will not know that it has to
pick a box now. This means that applying the same norm with
different grounding will require retraining. This limitation is
addressed below.
7B. Abstraction Through Grounding
An interesting distinction that is often made in Multi-Agent
Systems is whether or not agents know about the organization
in which they take part [30]. The approach described so far is
an example of agents not knowing about institutional structure,
thus agents are not able to consider normative changes when
generating trajectories. Agents can be made aware of the
abstract institutional context by explicitly representing norms
and grounding as an additional input vector to learning. In such
a scenario, agents would have enough information to associate
various grounded elements to their normative requirements.
The main disadvantage is that this would additionally increase
the size of the agents’ inputs, hence making learning more dif-
ficult. Another, more practical approach, would be to abstract
domain elements to the institutional level.
An abstraction of a domain element implies that its meaning
is defined in higher, more general categories. Roles, insti-
tution actions and artifacts represent such categories, mean-
ingful in social interaction. Our institutional model provides
a method where an agent’s observations and action space
can be both abstracted. The equivalence classes such as
[active], [position], [color], [detected], etc., each represent a
type of state-variables characterized by sharing the same
attribute or feature: ‘activation’, ‘position’, ‘color’, ‘detec-
tion’, etc. This is important since it allows us to create
an abstracted, institutional-level state-space, based on such
equivalence classes. Changing the grounding of roles, actions
or artifacts, may change a particular set of agents, behaviors,
and object, but equivalence classes will stay the same and
will now describe the state of the new grounded domain
elements. Therefore, we can create a stable feature vector
based on equivalence classes. Figure 2 illustrates this idea.
(A) is full state-space containing all state-variables describing
all agents, behaviors, and objects. (B) is institution-level state-
space, where states are partitioned by the equivalence classes
characterized by the same state-space features. Grounding
generates boundary conditions by selecting only state-variables
describing the state of grounded domain elements. Thus,
the state-space (B) represents states of institution categories
(Roles, Acts, Arts). Similarly, outputs of an abstract policy
represent institutional actions and are related to concrete
behaviors via grounding.
A policy learned in this way would, therefore, be at a higher
level of abstraction. We henceforth call such policies “abstract
policies”. Procedural knowledge (knowing how), stored in
abstract policies, is learned based on declarative norms seman-
tics defined as relations between (institution-level) categories
(roles, actions, artifacts). Grounding selects domain elements
that fit into these categories, thus the pattern of activation
generated by the abstract policy stays the same but is produced
with different (domain-level) agents, behaviors, and objects.
This means that in principle, an abstract policy may be
applied in every domain where the same (or similar) categories
can be identified since they will share the same or similar
features over which original policy was learned. Thus, the
advantage of abstraction is twofold. First, it can automatically
and significantly reduce the size of the observed state-space,
Fig. 2: State-space selection for state variables describing
institution categories. (A) is the full state space which is
usually encoded as an input in the standard policy. (B) repre-
sent state-space of abstract institution categories (Roles, Acts,
Arts). Grounding (full red line) generates boundary conditions
selecting only state-variables describing the state of grounded
domain elements.
(a) (b)
Fig. 3: (a) Observations: The full state space (A) is filtered
through (B) to sub-set of states (C); (b) Actions: The full set
of behaviors (A), are reduced (B) to grounded actions (C)
addressing the curse of dimensionality problem. Second, an
abstract policy can be applied (via grounding) to different
agents, behaviors, and objects, and more broadly to different
domains, thus achieving a transfer of learning. Figure 3 shows
a schematic view of an abstract policy’s inputs and outputs.
More about the nature of abstract representation of procedural
knowledge and its possible implication to Cognitive Science
is discussed in Section VI-A.
Among other things, the ability to re-ground norms to other
domains provides a workflow where one can train abstract
institutional policies in simulation (adapted to robotics) and
then re-ground them to real robotic systems. The trained policy
from simulation then can be updated by learning subtle details
with already trained (hence, ‘safe’ from the normative point
of view) policy.
8V. EXPERIMENTS
The goal of this section is to test and evaluate methods
described so far. In order to demonstrate the benefits of using
normative (social) knowledge and institution abstraction, we
choose a simulated environment where it is not so trivial to
learn normative behaviors. Thus, we train agents in model-free
settings, with relatively long temporal horizons and a large
number of states.
The goal of experiment 1 is to empirically prove that agents
can indeed learn to behave in accordance with institutional
norms. Experiment 2 compares standard policy learning with
learning abstracted policies. Here we hypothesize that learning
will be significantly faster if the state space is reduced via
abstraction. In the subsequent experiment 3, we ground the
abstract policy learned in experiment 2 on the new ’factory’
domain, demonstrating the transfer of learning. Experiment 4
focuses on reward shaping and we demonstrate its applications
on both standard full state-space learning and abstracted learn-
ing. In the last experiment 5, we use shaping and abstraction
and an additional agent to demonstrate applicability of the
method to multi-agent systems. We train two policies in
parallel, each controlling the behavior of one agent.
Videos accompanying this paper can be found at: https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=fzfZD4FyMv4.
A. Scenario
The scenario follows the normative behavior specified by
the ’Store’ institution. Robby is a robot, whose goal is to
obtain a pack of batteries. Instead of taking the batteries and
immediately exiting the store, Robby is aware of the human
institution providing social knowledge of how to behave in
buying/selling scenarios. Namely, Robby is aware of the
norms: An agent that wants to buy something should pick
the desired object and not other objects in the store, and it
should pay for the object before leaving the store with it.
The institution is specified as follows (we increase its
complexity as we progress through the experiments):
Store = 〈ArtsS ,RolesS ,ActsS ,NormsS〉
where
RolesS = {Buyer}
ActsS = {Pay,GetGoods}
ArtsS = {Goods,PayPlace}
NormsS = {MustUse ((Buyer,GetGoods,Goods))
MustAt ((Buyer,Pay,Payplace))
Before ((Buyer,GetGoods,Goods) ,
(Buyer,Pay,PayPlace))}
The examples domain include Robby and the set of its
behaviors. Robby knows how to take items, pay via wireless
money transfer, and open doors. Robby is also capable of
moving one step forward and backward, and rotate one step
left or right. The domain includes 13 items on sale in the
store: battery, drill, ax, screwdrivers etc., and a cash register.
The experiments focus only on learning normative policies,
Fig. 4: Simulated Store Environment
and not on particular behaviors (such as grasping an item)
thus all robot behaviors are atomic, that is, they are done in
one step. In the real case, these could be either other (sub)
policies or implemented behaviors. All norm semantics are
given previously (see Section III-D).
B. Experiments Setup
a) Software: Model-free RL requires a substantial
amount of training data, which we generate via simulation. In
this paper we used a game engine [31] to simulate a simplified
store domain (see Figure 4). The state of the art algorithm
Policy Proximal Optimization (PPO) [32] is used to train
simulated agents. This is done with the help of the Machine
Learning toolkit [33] (v0.6), which includes a TensorFlow
implementation of PPO and a bridge between simulation data
and the RL algorithm. For all reported experiments we used
maximum 2000 steps per episode. Environment and agents
restart if full adherence is achieved or if the simulation
step reaches the maximum count. In addition to the rewards
discussed earlier, the agent receives small negative feedback
(1.0e − 4) for each simulation step so as to make agents
finish the episode as soon as possible. We used the same
hyper-parameters in all experiments and some of them are
shown in Table I, where newly introduced beta is the entropy
regularization parameter (increasing it will influence policy
to take more random actions). Time horizon is the length of
generated trajectory used for gradient update and there are 3
layers of 256 training units. Parameters were chosen as a result
of pilot tests (not reported here).
beta gamma lambd learning rate num layers hidden units time horizon batch size
6e-3 0.99 0.95 3e-4 3 256 1024 1024
TABLE I: Hyper-parameters used for training in the experi-
ments
Robots observe the state of the environment through a
sensor consisting of 7 rays positioned at the center of the
agent, pointing in different directions. Each ray returns a
vector which encodes information about detected objects and
its normalized distance (see Figure 5a). Additional inputs are:
velocity vector of the agent, information about whether behav-
iors are already executed, and state variables ‘near’, indicating
whether an object is near the agent and ‘has’, indicating
whether the agent holds an object or not. The input vector
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Fig. 5: Vector input from one ray in the robot sensor in
institution focus approach
size is 162 elements. However, the abstract policy approach
encodes only states regarding grounded objects, while states
regarding other domain elements are encoded in only one
vector element merely as an indication of their existence
reducing the input vector to 39 elements (see Figure 5b).
b) Hardware: The simulations are executed on a desktop
computer with the following configuration: Intel Core i7
4790K CPU @ 4GHz (x64), 16GB DDR3 RAM, Nvidia
GTX970 (4GB GDDR5).
C. Experiment 1: Proof of Concept
The goal of this experiment is to learn the normative
behavior specified by the Store institution. The experiment
is executed in a simplified Store environment with 3 items,
using only adherent reward based on algorithm 1. Ground-
ings are given as follows: Ga = {Buyer,Robby}, Gb =
{GetGoods, pick}, Gb = {Pay, transfer} and Go =
{Goods, battery}.
Results are shown on Figure 6. The x axis shows the number
of steps, while the y axis shows the amount of accumulated
reward. ‘Mean’ line represents the learning curve averaged
over 10 independent training trials, where for each training
trial data is collected over 16 parallel simulations of the
environment. Figure 6 also shows the best learning curve
(out of 10 trials), which reached near optimal policy in the
minimum number of steps.
D. Experiment 2: Learning Abstract Policies
In this experiment, we turn our attention to abstracted policy
learning. We increase the complexity of the Store domain,
by adding 13 different store items. For training, we use only
adherent reward, as described in section IV-A, in two different
settings: (A) Standard learning (B) Abstract Learning. The
hypothesis is that the learning will be significantly faster in
setting (B) since the agent state-space is significantly reduced.
Results confirm our hypothesis. Figure 7a shows two learning
curves for settings (A) and (B), each of them representing a
mean of 10 different execution trials. In setting (A) the RL
agent didn’t manage to learn a normative policy in almost
Fig. 6: Experiment 1: Robby learning using only adherent
reward in simplified environment
all the trials, wherein in settings (B) almost all training trials
managed to converge to near-optimum behavior. The best and
only successful trial in standard learning (A) is compared to
the best trial in abstract learning (B) (see Figure 7b). Note that
the abstract policy is applicable to a whole category of inputs
– a subset of equivalence classes of state-variables – while
the standard policy is applicable only to one particular (fixed)
grounding. In that sense, these policies are not the same, and
the only reason we can compare them is that we have used
the same grounding for both of them.
The following experiment is concerned with demonstrating
and understanding the quality of an abstract policy when used
with a grounding other than that used for learning.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 7: Experiment 2: Comparison between standard learning
versus abstract learning: (a) means over 10 trials (b) best
results
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E. Experiment 3: Transfer of Learning
In section IV-B, we hypothesized that a policy learned
at the level of abstraction of institution can be used across
boundary conditions and domains. Thus, the goal of this
experiment is to apply the same set of norms in a novel
domain. In scenario (A) we test a new grounding in the same
domain: Go = {Goods, drill}. We expect that the agent will
know to buy the drill instead of the battery since now the
drill is abstracted to ’Goods’. It is important to stress that
while humans may assign different names to roles, actions or
artifacts over different domains, the pattern of agents behaviors
may still have the same semantics over such domains. Scenario
(B) demonstrates this concept, where we use a factory-yard
domain (see Figure 8). A robot named Forky is required
to sort out different items by locating them on a conveyor
belt, lifting them and bringing them to a container’s hatch for
disposal. We ground the Store institution to the new domain
as follows: Ga = {Buyer, Forky}, Gb = {GetGoods, lift},
Gb = {Pay, leave} and Go = {Goods, box1}. Forky is twice
as slow than Robby, the size of the environment is increased,
and the spatial layout is somewhat different. Additionally,
items that Forky is required to lift are moving, and sometimes
they are not in the environment at all (they appear on the
conveyor belt), which can additionally confuse the agent. In
the trials, we distinguish between: (B1) - directly applying the
abstract policy learned in the Store scenario; (B2) where we
continue training of the transferred policy in the new domain
for an additional 200k steps; and (B3) where we train the agent
from scratch.
Fig. 8: Factory-yard environment
Fig. 9: Experiment 3: Results averaged over 10 different
trials of learning from abstract Store policy (B2) compared
to learning from scratch(B3).
Results show that in the trail (A), Robby successfully locates
the drill (instead of the battery), picks it up and goes to
the cash register to pay. In scenario (B), with the original
store policy (case B1), Forky manages to search for and
navigate to the grounded factory item (box), lift it, and in
most of the episodes manages to reach the hatch to dispose
of the item. Figure 9 shows continuing training the policy
(B2) which did not improve agent behavior, while learning
from scratch (B3) did not manage to achieve any significant
results within 4M steps. Results are averaged over 10 different
trials. Interestingly, the cumulative reward in B2 started to
decline which shows that learning in the factory-yard is very
difficult (given its dynamics), whereas desired behavior is
easily achieved via a transfer of policies learned in a simpler
environment. Simple environments allow agents to base their
learning on exploiting salient features in the environment.
In the factory-yard domain, there are disturbing, dynamic
elements that have nothing to do with norms and it is much
harder to capture salient features leading to norm adherence.
Hence, the experiment demonstrates that it is much easier to
capture such features in an abstract policy learned in a simpler
environment and then applying it in “normatively-equivalent”
dynamic environment. The ability to transfer knowledge is
also important since it provides a way of learning abstract
policies that can capture salient features responsible for norm
adherence in simulations and then ground them to real-world
domains with complex dynamics. Real robotic agents may
continue to learn (subtle) differences between simulation and
the real-world in a safer and faster way than starting from
scratch.
F. Experiment 4: Normative Feedback
Figure 7 shows that the policy was not able to converge
(in almost all of the trials) in a complex state-space without
intermediate feedback. However, the information about norm
states can help the learning agent. The goal of this experiment
is to test reward based on feedback from individual norm
states and to assess whether it can more effectively/quickly
guide an agent towards a normative policy. The temporal
norms are hardest to learn since they directly introduce the
(temporal) credit assignment problem. We make the problem
even more challenging (compared to experiment 2) by adding
an additional temporal norm where now the buyer, after
paying, is expected to exit the store through the door. The
institution is extended with another action Exit and artifact
ExitPlace and the following norms:
MustAt ((Buyer,Exit,ExitPlace))
Before ((Buyer,Pay,PayPlace) ,
(Buyer,Exit,ExitPlace))
The hypothesis here is that Robby should learn the pol-
icy in a more complex environment even without institution
abstraction, however, the abstraction will lead to even faster
learning. We test two similar approaches designed to mitigate
the temporal assignment problem:
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(A.) Stop rewards after violation. Assign the same amount
of reward to each norm: 1.0 / (number of norms), for tran-
sition (n, f). However, stop rewards if any of the norms are
violated. This avoids local optima. The idea here is to steer
the agents towards temporally-consistent behaviors. Note that
adherent reward of value 1.0 is still given if all norms are
satisfied, making the maximum possible reward a little less
than 2.0 (taking into account small negative feedback from
the environment at every step).
(B.) Restart after the violation. The same shaping func-
tion as (A), with the difference that an episode is finished
(restarted) immediately after the violation. Agents do receive
the negative feedback equal to the sum of environmental
negative feedback from each step, which an agent would get
anyways before the end of an episode. The idea is to avoid any
future (ill-informative) updates of the policy since the norm
reward function will not give any feedback even when other
norms are achieved separately (as in case A). In addition,
this may shorten overall training time, since when a norm
is violated the agent doesn’t have to wait until the end of the
episode.
Figure 10a shows means over 10 training trials for both
shaping approaches (A) and (B) applied to standard (full-
state space) learning and abstracted learning. Both approaches
are similar, where slightly better results are achieved with
the approach (B). While, experiment 2 (see Figure 7) shows
that standard learning without shaping is unsuccessful in 4M
episodes, in this experiment with additional temporal require-
ments, results are significantly improved and the learning
curve is constantly increasing. Still, 4M steps are not sufficient
for all trials to reach their near-optimal policies. Figure 10b
shows the best results in all tested approaches.
G. Experiment 5: Multiple Agents
No specific changes have to be introduced in order to train
multiple agents. While it is possible to learn one abstract policy
to guide all the agents in the institution, in this experiment
each agent learns its own abstract policy. The rewards are
distributed in the following way. The acting of all agents
together creates a single domain trajectory which can be either
adherent to an institution or not, thus the final reward from the
full adherence is given to each agent that is grounded by the
institutional roles. Norms of particular agents depend on their
role in the grounding, thus each agent gets a feedback from the
norm shaping function for fulfilling the norms that are relevant
to it. Some norms are defined over more than one role: in such
cases, agents have to cooperate to receive a feedback reward.
In this experiment we use an additional robotic agent
named ’Kobby’ who is capable only of navigating, receiving
and accepting/declining payments from the nearby agents.
The institution now includes another role Seller, and action
ReceivePayment, with additional norms indicating that the
seller has to receive payment at the place of payment and a
temporal norm ’equals’ making sure that agents will synchro-
nize their behaviors, since its semantics specifies that paying
and receiving payment has to happen at the same time:
(a)
(b)
Fig. 10: Experiment 4: Rewards shaping. Two implementations
(A) and (B) of a reward function applied for (a) standard and
(b) abstract learning
MustAt ((Seller,ReceivePayment,PayPlace))
Equals ((Buyer,Pay,PayPlace) ,
(Seller,ReceivePayment,PayPlace))
Similarly as the temporal semantics of ‘before’, the ful-
fillment semantics of ‘equals’ can be defined by changing
relation between t1 and t2 to t1 = t2. Note that the norm is
defined between triples involving different roles. This means
that agents grounded to the role of ’Seller’ and ’Buyer’ have
to cooperate to achieve adherence, i.e., ‘Paying’ of one agent
should be at the same time as ‘ReceivingPayment’ of another
agent. Figure 11 shows that both agents have learned their
normative policies. The ’Buyer’ has to fulfill more norms
that the ’Seller’, which results in the difference in cumulative
reward. Both learning trials converge to near optimal policies.
H. Summary of Results
The overview of the experiments and the main results are
shown in Table II. Results reveal that learning normative
behavior using only adherent feedback at the end of the
episode, is possible (Experiment 1), but it is not convenient in
more complex state-spaces (Experiment 2). Much better results
are achieved when the state-space is simplified with respect to
grounding when learning abstract policies (Experiment 2). Ab-
straction also enables applying such policies to novel domains,
even when the policy in a novel domain is very hard to, or
cannot be learned from scratch (Experiment 3). Furthermore,
results show that normative reward feedback is highly useful
to steer the learning algorithm towards successful policies,
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 11: Experiment 5: Two policies (buyer and seller) are
trained in parallel: (a) Mean over 10 trials (b) Best out of 10
trials
Exp1 Exp2 Exp3 Exp4 Exp5
State-Space
Complexity Low High High High High
Temporal
Complexity Low Low Low High High
Standard
Learning Success Failed - - -
Standard
Learning
(Shaping)
- - - Success(needs more data) -
Abstract
Learning - Success
Failed (Learning)
Success (Transfer) - -
Abstract
Learning
(Shaping)
- - - Success(Best)
Success
(Multiple Agents)
TABLE II: Summary of the Results
even in complex environments (Experiment 4). However, the
best results are achieved when combining both approaches
together: intermediate normative feedback and (institution)
abstraction (Experiment 4). Finally, it is shown that, in the
same manner, it is possible to learn policies for coordinating
multiple agents (Experiment 5).
VI. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
Our current framework provides a way to model a set of
norms relevant to a given social context. Agents can learn
to behave and cooperate with respect to their assigned role
in a way predictable by humans. Still, focusing on only one
institution at the time can be limiting. In real-world examples,
humans often follow norms of multiple institutions concur-
rently. For example, normative behavior in a store also includes
adhering to other generally-accepted behavioral norms, like
not bumping into others, not making excessive noise, etc. Also,
knowing that an institution, e.g., a gas station, is subordinate
of a more general category of paying/trading institution, an
agent can assume that it has to pay for the gas, without
explicitly specifying it in a gas-station institution. Norms from
different institutions on different hierarchical levels should be
combined together to produce a full set of desired normative
behaviors. The study of how different institutions can be
related to each other, and how to exploit these relations in
verification, planning, and learning, should be investigated
further. Naturally, norms concern robot safety, and while we
plan to test transfer of normative (safe) policies to the real
world via grounding, safety issues go deeper than that [34].
One of the important questions that need answering is, can
humans identify the ‘critical mass’ of norms that would ensure
expected social behavior in all circumstances?
This paper focuses on demonstrating how our normative
framework can be used to create policies that generate norma-
tive behaviors. Still, the described method suggest possibilities
beyond those we have described. For example, imagine an
agent exploring an environment. Such an agent can be re-
warded for any trajectory for which an admissible grounding
can be found and which is adherent to institutional norms.
Since a much larger subset of trajectories can be used for
learning, such an algorithm should be more data-efficient, and
learn from fewer examples. Another unexplored possibility
would be to realize curriculum learning [35] by gradually
increasing the difficulty of the problem by changing the
grounding. Similarly, instead of randomizing items in our
simulated environment for each training episode, we could
have randomized grounding. An interesting direction is to
investigate the nature of the abstract knowledge representation
in the broader context of AI and Cognitive science. Some brief
discussions are covered below.
A. Connections to Cognitive Science
A policy is a sensory-motor (perception-action) map. Stan-
dard policies represent all sensory inputs and actions out-
puts, while abstract policies have abstract, that is, inputs/out-
puts related to categories. Abstract policies store procedural
knowledge for achieving declarative semantics specified on
an abstract (categorical) level. In psychology and cognitive
science, a pattern of behaviors that organize categories of
information and relationships between them is known as
‘schema’ (e.g. [36]). The term ‘schema’ was initially intro-
duced in psychology by Bartlett [37]. The paper proposes that
human knowledge is stored in underlying mental structures
that represent a generic knowledge about the world. Since
then, many other terms are used to describe schema, such as:
‘frame’, or ‘script’. They are also referred to as a ‘mental’
models or representations, ‘concepts’, etc.
As described by Hampson and Morris [38], schema (or
plural ‘schemata’), “store both declarative (‘what’) and pro-
cedural (‘how’) information, where declarative knowledge is
knowing facts, knowing that something is the case, while pro-
cedural knowledge is knowing how to do something”. Exactly
this is the ontology modeled in our framework (see III-F).
Furthermore, Alba and Hasher [39] describe four important
13
processes relevant to schemata: (1) choosing incoming stimuli,
which can guide attention and focus only on relevant stimuli;
(2) abstraction, which stores the meaning without the details
(its original content); (3) interpretation of the new information
by association to previously-stored knowledge; and (4) inte-
gration of those processes into a memory. It can be argued that
we have made a step towards achieving these processes in our
computational framework, thus creating a schematic knowl-
edge representation. Choosing incoming stimuli is done via
grounding. The knowledge stored in abstract policies does not
contain information about a particular domain, rather it stores
information regarding relations between (social) categories. As
such, it can be used to interpret information about new domain
elements depending on previously-stored relations, by fitting
them into corresponding (social) categories. By exploiting
properties (2) and (3) we were able to achieve the transfer
of learning (see Section V-E).
Early work in computer science, focusing on creating
‘frames’ in machines, was conducted by Minsky [40]. He
argued that humans are using stored knowledge about the
world to accomplish many of the processes that the frame-
work was attempting to emulate. Based on this work, new
theories about mental representation emerged in the field of
cognitive psychology (e.g., [41]). The importance of schematic
knowledge representation is explained in the book by Thagard
[42], stating that people have “mental processes that operate
by means of mental representations for the implementation
of thinking and action”. Indeed, schemata are the foundation
of numerous theories regarding modeling human cognition,
concepts formation, language development and comprehen-
sion, culture, representational theories of mind, etc. Being able
to realize explicit schematic (conceptual) knowledge through
our computational model, may have further influence on the
development of such theories. While this paper is focused on
representing social normative knowledge, the knowledge about
other properties of the world is represented with other types of
schemata, for instance, self-schema, knowledge about oneself
based on past and grounded in present experiences; object-
schema, knowledge about different categories of objects, their
function, and structure, etc. How to design and combine dif-
ferent types of schemata, and use it for robots is an interesting
and promising area for future investigation.
The area of ’Grounded Cognition’ [43], states that “con-
ceptual representation underlying knowledge is grounded in
sensory and motor systems” and perception-action links are
used “as a common base of simple behavior as well as complex
cognitive and social skills”. One of the main questions to
answer in this filed is: how abstract concepts such as ‘democ-
racy’ [44] can be formed from the sensory-motor experience?
A possible solution to this problem is proposed by Barsalou
[45], where such abstract concepts can be created through
mental simulations and conceptual combinations. Similarly,
Svensson and Ziemke [46] argue based on evidence from
a range of disciplines, that higher-level concepts and cog-
nitive processes are based on simulations of sensory-motor
processes. Robots are often used for the demonstration of such
theories [47]. A review of computational modeling approaches
concerned with learning abstract concepts in embodied agents
(robots), is given by Cangelosi and Stramandinoli [44]. Our
model allows us to represent some of the abstract concepts
that can be specified as an institution. For instance, it would
be possible to specify an ‘election’ institution, including roles
such as leader and voter, and actions that count-as voting —
inserting a paper into a box. However, defining more complex
concepts (e.g., ‘democracy’), would, probably, require relating
multiple institutions.
At the current stage of our work, we are not combining
abstract knowledge into more complex structures. This seems
like an important direction for future study. The question of
how conceptual knowledge may be combined via a combina-
tion of abstract policies is discussed below (see Section VI-C).
B. Connections to Cognitive Linguistics
Cognitive and linguistic theories are linked together in the
multidisciplinary area of cognitive linguistics. The knowledge
representation is often necessary for explaining the acquisi-
tion, comprehension, and use of language and its relation to
meaning. Jean Piaget’s theories [49] suggest two processes,
central for child development: accommodation and assimila-
tion. Former describes creating new or changing old schemes
when a certain situation doesn’t make sense, while the latter
is understanding the world through already existing schemata.
He argues that children first have to develop a mental represen-
tation of the world (schemata) and then base their language on
such representations. Our framework is not focused on linguis-
tic representation. Language has a deeper and more complex
structure than our current framework can express. Still, some
interesting connections exist and deserve a brief discussion.
Norms are part of human language, and our work on how
to make robots ‘understand’ norms in terms of execution,
may prove to be similar to how language is understood in
general (or at least some of its parts). The fact that language
is a social phenomenon, that its meaning depends on context,
and given that both triples, role-action-artifacts, and subject-
predicate-object, abstract agents interactions, indicates that a
computational model based on related principles of categorical
abstraction may be created. For instance, a simple sentence
like “Bring me a glass of water”, can be grounded by the same
abstract knowledge representation used in ‘Store’ institution
(see Section V), where a robot should now go and pick up
(GetGoods) the glass of water (Goods) and bring it to a human
(Register). Similarly, the same knowledge can be grounded
to a sentence with the same meaning in other languages.
Furthermore, a simple sentence such as “John opens the
door” has a certain underlying (abstract) semantics, which can
be captured with our model. Humans know how to ground
abstract knowledge to language symbols in the syntactically
right way. The wrong grounding would produce word order
that would lead to ill-formed sentences or categorical errors,
which cannot make sense in terms of execution. For example,
switching the grounding of the agent with the grounding of the
object, in the same sentence, would result in the meaning of
the form “Door opened John”. Moreover, a sentence using
words such as ‘who’, ‘what’, etc., indicating the lack of
grounding. For instance “Who opens the door?”, lacks the
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subject or (agent) grounding. Finally, the grounding depends
on object affordances (see [24]), thus syntactically correct
sentence with not-admissible grounding will not have sense,
e.g., “John jumps the door”. The same abstract knowledge
may be grounding to many different symbols, thus forming
many different sentences with the same meaning. Naturally,
the question arises: is such or similar abstract knowledge
representation a step towards realizing the universal property
for all languages (language universals)?
Finally, ‘metaphors’ are often used in linguistic theories:
“The essence of metaphor is understanding one kind of
thing in terms of another”[50]. According to this definition,
metaphors could be explained with ‘interpretation’ property
(see Section VI-A or Alba and Hasher [39]) of abstract knowl-
edge (schema). One of the key questions is “whether these
metaphors simply reflect linguistic convention or whether they
actually represent how people think” [51].
C. Future Work
We prioritize on the investigation of what is possibilities to
achieve with abstract policies in computer simulation while
applying and testing obtained results on real robots.
Exploring Grounding. While in this paper we have demon-
strated learning of abstract policies based on all institution
norms, it is also possible to learn each norm independently
and separately and store them in separate ‘primitive’ abstract
policies. Such policies could then be combined to achieve
normative behavior as specified by the institution, by finding
the grounding that produces an adherent trajectory. Further-
more, primitive abstract policies can be used outside the scope
of their normative meaning. Each of them would contain
procedural knowledge of how to achieve one particular relation
described by the norm qualifier (e.g., prepositions) regarding
temporal relations (after, before, during, overlap, etc.), spatial
(at, near, on, below, etc.), but also other relation of interest.
An agent grounded by a primitive policy would act towards
‘achieving’ it. For instance, if a policy that captures concept
‘at’, grounds an agent and an object representing a football
field, the agent will act towards being at that football field.
Changing the grounded object would make the agent move
to another area and activating another primitive policy will
make the agent act towards ‘achieving’ the new policy. Thus,
it would be possible to explore the world, by exploring ground-
ing of such policies, which can be further used for learning
or planning. This possibility seems interesting to explore and
would require learning a set of primitive abstract policies
over diverse examples. Then another policy will output a
vector encoding possible groundings and possible primitive
policies to be activated. This will allow learning groundings
of primitive policies in order to generate agents behaviors
that maximize certain reward. Also, such a design may make
learning on the level of granularity more meaningful from the
human perspective.
Hierarchical/Recursive Grounding. The described hypothet-
ical process of learning grounding of ‘primitive’ abstract poli-
cies and combining them into more complex representations,
would still have a ‘flat’ structure. A complementary idea in this
direction of research is to investigate grounding of ‘primitive’
policies on other such policies. In an early investigation, we
were able to define norms in terms of other norms, where we
have defined the ‘before’ norm over two other ‘must’ norms.
The agent has successfully learned to fulfill both ‘must’ norm
in correct sequential order. Such hierarchical grounding was
implicit, and future research effort should make it explicit.
Being able to hierarchically ground abstract policies would
mean that simple concepts could be combined in hierarchical
structures, which should enable agents to understand more
complex forms of norms, and explore the world on different
levels of granularity, just by exploring grounding.
Grounding and Transfer of Knowledge. At the current level
of development of our model, whether an abstract policy
can be applied in a given domain, or not, can be decided
by a human knowledge engineer. However, an interesting
question needs answering is: how should a computational
system know to automatically ground an abstract policy in
novel domains? In Section IV-B we explain that the abstract
policy can be (in principle) grounded in domains that shares
the same features as the categories over which abstract policy
is originally learned. However, in practice, the success of
a transfer may depend on other morphological/isomorphic
(syntactic/semantics) similarities. Related ideas are suggested
in the area of analogy reasoning [52] [53], and they may serve
as a source of inspiration for future research. Researches in
this area were able to explain how a mapping of a domain
to other domains may result in creativity and some forms of
reasoning [54].
In this section, we have briefly discussed the nature of
abstract knowledge representation in our framework, some
ideas for future work and its possible implications to other
areas. Interestingly, in this view, all of the discussed areas
may have something in common: the grounding of abstract
knowledge representation. A multi-disciplinary research effort
may be needed for a unifying cognitive model where the
grounding of abstract knowledge plays a central role.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Future robots will need to follow human social norms
in order to be useful and accepted in human society. On
the other hand, recent successes in reinforcement learning
techniques may further speed up the development of robotics.
In this paper, we propose a method to bring social norms
to reinforcement learning algorithms together through our
institutional framework. We are able to: (1) provide a way to
intuitively encode social knowledge (through norms); (2) guide
learning towards normative behaviors (through an automatic
norm reward system); and (3) achieve a transfer of learning by
abstracting policies; Finally, (4) the method is not dependent
on a particular RL algorithm (although it was tested with a
particular RL algorithm). We show how our approach can be
seen as a means to achieve abstract procedural knowledge
representation and we discuss its implication to cognitive
science.
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